Abstract Perceptual systems respond to proximal stimuli by forming mental representations of distal stimuli. A central goal for the philosophy of mind is to characterize the representations delivered by perceptual systems for use in cognition and action. Some theorists argue that perceptual systems deliver representations couched in proprietary iconic (image-like) formats, distinct from the discursive (language-like) format of thoughts, and that this difference in format grounds the distinction between perception and congnition (Dretske 1981; Carey 2009; Burge 2014; Block ms.). Others argue that perception and cognition always trade in the same code (Prinz 2002; Pylyshyn 2003). This talk will argue against both approaches in favor of perceptual pluralism: perception delivers a multiplicity of representational formats, some iconic and some discursive.
This seminar is hosted by the Department of Philosophy.
Reception to follow in Wilson 212 (Danforth Campus).
For inquiries contact Sue McKinney.